



**THEMES AND TECHNIQUES FROM MODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: THE DUBIOUS  
CONTINUANCE OF *GRAVITY'S RAINBOW***

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**ABSTRACT**

The issue with endeavoring to talk about the contrasts amongst innovation and postmodernism very quickly introduces itself in most talk as a progression of untrustworthy polarities. In this talk, innovation progresses toward becoming related to a requirement for "nextness" or "development," while postmodernism has perhaps made an alternate fleeting mode to separate itself. There does not appear to be an agreement on what this fleetingness is; because of the presence of an assortment of conceivable clarifications endeavoring to clarify these worldly moves, a significant part of the hypothesis appended to these ideas still remains very vague. Yet, I incorporated this dialog of McHale's hypothesis of the postmodern as a segue into my motivations here, which is to recommend that the expressions "postmodernism" and "innovation" are liquid, half-breed terms that are on a very basic level contained in each other. Along these lines, an endeavor to represent the multi-interpretive smoothness of innovation and postmodernism, the focal point of this examination as the questionable continuation will investigate the stylish and hypothetical merging's of two of the most vital writings of the twentieth century. It is vital to investigate how these classifications are liable to change in view of a semi parallax association with any given arrangement of hypothetical systems.

**Keywords:** Innovation, modernism, dubious, cyberpunk, skepticism, mysticism, paranoia, parodies, pastiches

**INTRODUCTION**

Maybe the most acclaimed of these resistances is the idea of innovation as fundamentally an epistemological exercise and postmodernism as even more an attention to ontological concerns. Brian McHale in "What is Postmodernism?" alludes to this as a "move of the overwhelming": "So the change-over from modernism to postmodernism isn't a matter of something new entering the picture, but a reshuffling of the deck: what was present but 'backgrounded' in modernism becomes 'foregrounded' in postmodernism" (McHale). McHale examines this hypothesis in conjunction with John Frow's 1997 "What Was Postmodernism?" and Harry Levin's 1960 canonization of innovation in "What Was Modernism?" Both Frow and Levin center on the idea of a "changed tense" in the recorded movement from innovation to postmodernism. Levin sees innovation as just history, which appears to be conceivable because of the ex-post facto nature of his examination of 1922, however, this development just works in the event that we surrender that by 1960 we have entered the postmodern. The possibility of the postmodern, as per Frow, is constructed principally with respect to the "modernist logic of innovation and obsolescence" (Frow 36): "Eventually, this relentless logic of superseding oneself requires that modernism itself become obsolete" (McHale).

“One option might be to adopt a temporality of stasis in contradistinction to modernism's dynamism - either in the form of a static neoclassicism, or in the form of apocalypse and the end of history. Alternatively, postmodernism might attempt to outstrip modernism by adopting an even more frantic pace of innovation and obsolescence, speeding up the cycle until it approached the seasonal rhythm of fashion” (McHale).

In spite of these conceivable other options to clarify postmodernism, there is much more grounded proof to help a hypothesis of "numerous and uneven circumstances, or non-synchronicity," which places that it is workable for innovation and postmodernism to at the same time exist because of the unevenness of social post-modernization. McHale, in the end, makes the essential qualification of the post-modernization of expressions of the human experience: “In other fields, those with heterogeneous and contested modernisms, such as film, painting, or literature, the term ‘postmodernism’ is correspondingly optional, dispensable, or problematic” (McHale). Before McHale inevitably proposes his hypothesis of the ontological versus the epistemological, he thinks about himself over each of the constructivist:

“Period terms like postmodernism are strategically useful; they help us see connections among disparate phenomena, but at the same time they also obscure other connections, and we must constantly weigh the illumination they shed over here against the obscurity they cast over there”(McHale).

It appears to be intensely illogical to exhibit a "foundation" versus "closer view" hypothesis of the epistemological and ontological subsequent to putting forth this expression. In spite of the fact that McHale perceives the dubiousness of these inflexible polarities, he appears to depend on a kind of parallel classification that is oftentimes deceptive.

I incorporated this dialog of McHale's hypothesis of the postmodern as a segue into my motivations here, which is to recommend that the expressions "postmodernism" and "innovation" are liquid, crossbreed terms that are in a general sense contained in each other. Any given show-stopper that has been completely named as either postmodernist or pioneer can't avoid what it endeavors to desert. Tasteful "contrasts" amongst postmodernism and innovation have been induced essentially through basic hypothesis that has endeavored to sort certain stylish and social crossroads ever. At the point when unbending rules are made to clarify gatherings of apparently comparable feel, these hypothetical "boxes" neglect to clarify the likelihood of cross-stylish joining. At the end of the day, there really is no "unadulterated" gathering of style that separates the pioneers from the postmodernists; fittingly, these terms have been utilized as interpretive systems that have bit by bit moved toward becoming related with certain social and recorded milieus. For instance, postmodernism is intensely connected with existentialism, so existentialist hypothesis is frequently introduced in stylish plans of "postmodern" writings. When endeavoring to translate a specific work, we search for these sorts of "hypothetical signs" to clarify a stylish. In Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*, the staggering feeling of foolishness in this manner progresses toward becoming likened with the anomic perspective related with existentialism. Presently we have made the accompanying affiliations: *Waiting for Godot* highlights silliness, which is a component of existentialism, which has turned out to be appended to the postmodern hypothesis; hence, *Waiting for Godot* is essentially a postmodern play. At the point when the expressions "postmodernism" and "innovation" as utilized as interpretive catalysts, these sorts of affiliations are made trying to clarify feel that would somehow or another be without any relevant significance.

Thomas Pynchon's 1973 *Gravity's Rainbow* and in like manner *Gravity's Rainbow* is every now and again referred to as the best case of postmodernism in the second 50% of the twentieth century. My motivation is to not really dishonor these announcements by and large; I am more worried about looking at the likenesses between the two writings to portray how *Gravity's Rainbow* can't totally separate from itself from the innovation it has as far as anyone knows abandoned. For one, *Gravity's Rainbow's* style is normally contradistinguished from pioneer "family propensities" construct principally in light of the kinds of hypothetical affiliations I exhibited above with *Waiting for Godot*. It

is more vital to see how these writings can be translated as innovator, postmodernist, or both at the same time. How much these books are classified depends on the intermixing of phrased developments with a given stylish or hypothetical structure. *Gravity's Rainbow* as postmodernist for being distributed in 1973, a period when postmodern talk started to create the basic hypothesis. On the other hand, Pynchon's etymological investigations could be translated as on a very basic level pioneer. It appears as though the two books work on a coin-like tasteful in which the one writer appears to vary between this stylish classification by means of experimentation in shape and setting. In spite of the fact that it appears to be interesting to consider something as included two classifications all the while, this idea of a range as opposed to strict tasteful outlines loans belief to the interpretive idea of these terms. It has surely been less demanding to name certain fills in as essentially one class or the other and keeping in mind that a given work may seem to display certain propensities identified with a specific classification.

I have distinguished different tasteful and hypothetical likenesses between the messages in my endeavors to depict the hidden hybrids between these paragons of the cutting-edge vanguard. I have concentrated more on endeavoring to discover qualities that could be deciphered as either postmodernist or pioneer and, along these lines, subject to change because of the flexibility of hypothetical and interpretive developments.

The principal things will investigate how Pynchon campaign neurosis regarding tumult, modern culture (cyberpunk), entropy, incredulity, otherworldliness and religion, and product culture. Pynchon's neurosis all through *Gravity's Rainbow* speaks to a post-war society where innovation and cyberpunk scenes are compared with the supernatural quality of astral projection, séances, clairvoyant portrayal, and so on. For instance, *The Zone* presents human presence as a liminal projection got between a cabalistic overall intrigue and a prophetically calamitous vision of the internet, pareidolias, paranoiac images of phalluses and preterition, While in the meantime making a feeling of premonition through promotions, flyers, and heavenly and religious images that Bloom and different characters see for the duration of the day that estimate or consider certain occasions in the novel. Like Pynchon's distrustfulness is established in pondering chronicled accounts. Stephen's hypothesis of Shakespeare, for instance, is inserted in a kind of fear inspired notion that follows designs all through Shakespeare's plays, making a feeling of wariness in connection to Shakespeare's verifiable character. I will investigate other literary cases of distrustfulness in the one novel to show how this feeling of "Them," albeit now considered a "postmodern" figure of speech, can be found in Pynchon's exemplification of a comparative sort of suspicion in *Gravity's Rainbow*.

It has progressed toward becoming to some degree a platitude that postmodernism is de-historicized and level because of product culture and free enterprise. Pynchon's farces, pastiches, and inferences make rationalistic analyses on the very societies in which the creators themselves well. A comparable case of pastiche in *Gravity's Rainbow* is Pynchon's treatment of pop culture: his dark popular culture references are a portrayal of the idea of item culture and history – what big names does history recollect? Do we truly depend on "pop" pictures of the past? *Gravity's Rainbow* is likewise an all-encompassing microcosm of social and recorded sensibilities diverted through fundamentally the same as elaborate themes, frequently utilizing a sort of social ingenuity as a remark on the postmodern condition, which, I will contend, isn't drained of verifiable relevance. Notwithstanding their different associations with history, *Gravity's Rainbow* is doubtful of recorded accounts: Pynchon is wary of the credibility of customary trustworthiness. In this paper, I will follow the similitudes of Pynchon's perspectives of history and culture. *Gravity's Rainbow* plays with the assortment and maybe subjectivity of history, highlighting more than 400 characters whose viewpoints are investigated.

I will likewise investigate various hypotheses identifying with fluctuating methods of social talk versus changing thoughts of tasteful portrayal, including the idea of an undeniably self-reflexive

cutting-edge sensibility and additionally discourses of post-structuralism, mass culture, high versus low societies, and unexpected juxtaposition. It appears as though Pynchon ponder their particular eras, which to some degree clarifies the different tasteful and chronicled affiliations we have of innovation and postmodernism. On Victorian and mid-twentieth century culture through unexpected juxtapositions of high versus low and investigates the political and social states of mind of different eras, while Pynchon's novel is an amalgamation of countercultural legislative issues and, maybe, the counter scholarly sensibilities of the 1960s. Subsequently, this novel is by all accounts depictions of cutting-edge culture endemic to specific crossroads ever. While Pynchon's novel has an atmosphere of the camp sensibility of the 1960s in which the revolting progresses toward becoming craftsmanship. We can see these books as verifiable and tasteful ancient rarities of both the advanced and postmodern condition, albeit numerous scholars would discover this fairly contradictory to the postmodern hypothesis, which customarily accentuates content's formal components outside of chronicled setting. I will endeavor to separate between the feel themselves and the hypothesis encompassing the style.

My last two things center particularly on the meta-anecdotal parts of the writings. It has been set by scholars, for example, Clement Greenberg that the cutting-edge has turned out to be progressively self-reflexive, which, I will contend, frequently turns into a sort of meta-portrayal. It is hard to arrange farce, pastiche, and foolishness as either postmodernist or pioneer, as both the innovators and postmodernists regularly use these tropes. In general "meta" impact in *Gravity's Rainbow* could be both innovator and postmodernist regarding self-reflexivity, phony, and intertextuality, none of which are characteristically arranged in one stylish "box" or the other. The writings appear to be "mindful" of themselves as writings by exploring different avenues regarding these different themes.

At long last this paper will broaden my past idea of meta-textuality to particular elaborate attributes of the two books that could be either present day or postmodern, and, all the more particularly, why it is hard to make slick little "boxes" that endeavor to classify what is "postmodern" versus "current." The exploratory idea of innovation is at times made light of when concessions are made to an oppositely oppositional postmodernism; these kinds of paired developments organize canonization to the detriment of extremely complex stylish intertextuality. What makes *Gravity's Rainbow* an especially troublesome novel to sort is its "ultra-modernism," or, as I call it, "postmodernism before postmodernism," a kind of pre-arrangement of postmodernism that in a general sense complies with the innovator rationale of "nextness," which isn't totally crushed in postmodern writing as kept up by numerous scholars, for what reason do a few scholars flinch at the possibility of calling *Gravity's Rainbow* as an example of postmodernism? Regardless of the issues of these hypothetical models, I will endeavor to represent what has continued to *Gravity's Rainbow* and how certain themes could be in both "boxes" of innovation and postmodernism all the while.

Distrustfulness and Reality, the thought of outrageous neurosis has turned out to be connected to thoughts encompassing speculations of a postmodern culture. Some of these hypotheses specifically address suspicious society or are appropriate to specific messages in which this idea of a far-reaching "postmodern" neurosis has particular complex portrayals. In this paper, I will look at specific parts of this idea of distrustfulness in connection to the troubles of characterization; in dichotomous structures, the postmodern content is marked "jumpy", while the innovator content is frequently recognized by some kind of "confidence". This sort of model just too some degree clarifies this exceptionally complex style: in *Gravity's Rainbow*, suspicion, similar to innovation and postmodernism in them, takes an assortment of structures that are hard to connect to a solitary stylish or hypothetical school of thought. Before suggesting a talk of the methods of neurosis in *Gravity's Rainbow*, it is important to examine quickly a couple of these hypotheses and how their talk is helpful for a comprehension of both innovator and postmodernist setups of distrustfulness.

Michel Foucault is maybe the scholar most nearly connected with distrustfulness in the postmodern talk: the idea of the "Panopticon" is, in itself, a suspicious perusing of present-day society. Foucault's 1975 *Discipline and Punish* proposes the presence of a panoptic, carceral society in which people could conceivably be mindful of being viewed: "The inmate must never know whether he is being looked at any one moment, but he must be sure that he may always be so" (Foucault 201). Foucault utilizes the expression "prisoner" to expand upon the thought of present-day society as a moral story for a definitive jail, which, as he contends, has turned into the general public in which we live, where the Panopticon:

"Is polyvalent in its applications; it serves to reform prisoners, but also to treat patients, to instruct schoolchildren, to confine the insane, to supervise workers, to put beggars and idlers to work. It is a type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization, of disposition of centres and channels of power, of definition of the instruments and modes of intervention of power, which can be implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools, prisons. Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used" (Foucault 205).

This panoptic pattern could be connected to various "postmodern" books, considerably more particularly to the sci-fi sort. A stunningly better case of the Panopticon could be Ken Kesey's 1962 *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*, where the use of Foucault's emphasis on reconnaissance society is obviously clear in Kesey's hypothesis of the 'Consolidate.' Perhaps distrustfulness has turned out to be firmly identified with the postmodern novel because of our undeniably innovative society, yet even before the assumed end of innovation, there can be discovered shifting degrees of suspicion in innovator writing in light of this panoptic diagram. I utilized 1984 for instance of a "postmodern" novel, yet it scarcely makes the cutoff into postmodernism if innovation finished in 1940. On the off chance that we could even now think about 1984 as an innovator novel, at that point it could be contended that the pioneers, in any event, prefigured huge numbers of the gathered "outrageous" employments of neurosis in books, for example, *Gravity's Rainbow*, so there emerge numerous covers in the developments of suspicion utilized by both the innovators and postmodernists. For instance, Eliot's *The Waste Land* exemplifies a jumpy sensibility in the "Round of Chess" segment of the sonnet, where the broke down shape is vigorously impacted by the distrustful pipedreams of a lady who speaks to a significant number of the anxieties of present-day sexuality. At the end of the day, you could apply this neurotic, panoptic outline to books inside the "pioneer" school since, on occasion, the innovators are similarly as jumpy as the postmodernists, as on account of *Gravity's Rainbow*.

Jean Baudrillard's 1981 *Simulacra and Simulation* also offer a distrustful perusing of society, yet maybe not as straightforwardly as Foucauldian examination. Baudrillard's accentuation is the thought of "simulacra" and hyperreality in postmodern culture, where, as per Baudrillard, reality and the virtual are obscured in hyperrealistic, estranging limits. Baudrillard follows the presence of simulacra all through the ages, coming full circle as far as anyone knows in postmodern culture's absence of a settled reality. In his online modules on Jean Baudrillard, Dino Felluga, the educator at Purdue University and designer of the exceedingly acclaimed site Introduction to Critical Theory, composes:

"In the third order of simulacra, which is associated with the postmodern age, we are confronted with a precession of simulacra; that is, the representation precedes and determines the real. There is no longer any distinction between reality and its representation; there is only the simulacrum" (Felluga, "Modules on Baudrillard: On Simulation").

This "hyperreality" is generally found in sci-fi books, for example, Philip K. Dick's *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep*, which gives a general public over-burden simulacrum as notices, mechanical creatures, and cyberpunk themes. Similarly, as with Foucault, you could apply Baudrillard's perusing of postmodern culture to innovator society also: the "three requests of simulacra" are readings of different purposes of modernization. By and by, the possibility of a postmodern neurosis could be compared with "extraordinary distrustfulness", yet I think the distinctions and likenesses in the utilization of suspicion as a gadget in *Gravity's Rainbow* isn't constructed exclusively in light of levels

of furthest point; a fortiori, the qualification, I believe, is constructed more in light of expressive setups of suspicion that vacillate in changing degrees all through the one book, not really a central contrast in the general impact. In spite of the fact that *Gravity's Rainbow* is perhaps more specifically neurotic, have a similarly strong suspicion.

Pynchon's distrustfulness in *Gravity's Rainbow* is perplexing for its expressive portrayal of a prophetically calamitous vision of a frustrated, befuddled, mechanically propelled post-World War II society. What, precisely, about this vision of society is "postmodern?" If we apply McHale's idea of the ontological, which conceptualizes the uncertainty of "genuine" reality, this suspicion could be translated as a Baudrillardian construction of hyperreality. This understanding is surely stable, however, it neglects to completely oblige the generally epistemological issues of Pynchon's subjective substances, where the genuine trouble in recognizing what is genuine is an error between our perceptual information frameworks and how these frameworks decide reality; it is our subjective learning frameworks that detail the genuine versus the virtual. Besides, in the event that we apply parts of McHale's hypothesis, it would maybe be more precise to mark Pynchon's distrustfulness as epistemologically ontological, particularly since the terms are regularly to a great degree proximal in hypothetical applications.

Another conceivable capacity of this suspicion is the idea of the furthest point, which I beforehand proposed regularly, connects with the postmodern. For one, Pynchon is in totally unique account milieus, Pynchon in a prophetically catastrophic science fiction setting. Pynchon's neurosis just seems more extraordinary in light of the fact that *Gravity's Rainbow* is basically a moral story for Pynchon's perspective of the course society is taking in the "postmodern" world. As indicated by Mark R. Siegel, "His major interest in *Gravity's Rainbow* is with the patterns of technology and culture which determine, together with the physical laws of the universe, what is born out of the chaos into which we have descended" (Siegel 40). Accordingly, Pynchon gives off an impression of being all the more straight forwardly jumpy as a way to improve the moral story.

Check R. Siegel in "Inventive Paranoia: Understanding the Systems of *Gravity's Rainbow*" orders Pynchon's self-reflexive suspicion as "an exercise in creative paranoia, a self-conscious construction of a variety of possible worlds" (Siegel 53). Siegel, for the most part, takes note of Pynchon's ontological neurosis, yet he additionally says one part of the epistemological:

"Ambiguity, not deterministic certainty, is the essential fuel for such Creative Paranoia. 'Real' or 'Unreal' is impossible to know, since they seem to be defining our meaning of our 'Reality.' It is this system that matters in allowing man to structure and respond to the contemporary world" (Siegel 53).

As Siegel represents, Pynchon makes an arrangement of "They" that particularly reviews a kind of observation society much the same as Foucault: "They know he is on to them. There is the usual chance his paranoia's just out of hand again, but the coincidences are running too close" (Pynchon 262). This reluctant distrustfulness is urgent to Pynchon's Panopticon, which is enveloped by an arrangement of unwritten "rules" (or maxims) contained in the characters' aggregate cognizance: "Proverbs for Paranoids 3: If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about answers" (Pynchon 251). The camera is regularly intently connected with a sort of voyeuristic neurosis, or, rather, a Hitchcockian idea of being viewed by an obscure watcher. Grigori the octopus, an example in Pointsman's plan at the White Visitation, sees Katje on a perception screen from his water tank: "The camera follows as she moves deliberately nowhere long-legged about the rooms..." (Pynchon 113). This kind of "perception" turns into a fetishistic treatment of "examples" under the steady investigation of researchers, for example, the Pavlovian examinations directed on Slothrop in Dr Jamf's lab: "Unconditioned stimulus = stroking penis with antiseptic cotton swab; unconditioned response = hardon..." (Pynchon 84). Observational brain science is by all accounts one of "Their"

frameworks in which each quirk of one's life is solicited for the "benefit of science": "Kevin Spectro will take his syringe and spike away a dozen times tonight, into the dark, to sedate Fox" (Pynchon 47).

All through Slothrop's numerous experiences with neurosis, the expression "pareidolia" is absolutely an appropriate idea too, where there is a consistent battle in choosing if there are really any examples of occasions whatsoever: "...there is still anti-paranoia, where nothing is connected to anything, a condition not many of us can bear for long" (Pynchon 434). This liveliness with jumpy schizophrenia is surely a magnificent contender for postmodernism's heterogeneity, yet this thought ought not to be utilized to undermine the distrust at the peak of high innovation. Innovation is established in a fundamentally the same as the type of "suspicious doubt" in which control frameworks in charge of the presence of certain social organizations are vigorously examined.

In *Gravity's Rainbow*, there is an interconnection amongst innovation and what I term "astronomical distrustfulness." The setting of *Gravity's Rainbow* is particularly much the same as cyberpunk, where there is a mix of hyperrealism and innovation and additionally thoughts of observation society, turmoil, entropy, and devastation. This cyberpunk moiety is compared with a kind of "enchantment" in which there additionally exists components of the paranormal and ultra-mundane. These components are additionally intermixed by means of stimulating daydreams, designs, intrigues, preterition, and the liminality of subjective reality, making a milieu in which the possibility of a Baudrillardian hyperreality is surely appropriate. Pynchon's "They" framework progresses toward becoming established in a universe that places numerous or clashing substances, hence making it hard to really recognize what "happens" in the novel, a kind of suspicion, as I said, epistemologically ontological in its different consequences.

The opening succession in *Gravity's Rainbow* presents Pynchon's theme of proudly setting the peruser in substances that might possibly be really "happening": "A screaming comes across the sky. It has happened before, but there is nothing to compare it to now. It is too late. The Evacuate still proceeds. There are no lights inside the cars. No light anywhere..." (Pynchon 3). It is step by step uncovered that we are in Pirate Prentice's fantasy, however the change to "the truth" is abrupt to the point that it is not entirely obvious: "His name is Capt. Geoffrey Prentice. He is wrapped in a thick blanket, a tartan of orange, rust, and scarlet. His skull feels made of metal" (Pynchon 4). Pynchon's confining of the truth is frequently a progression of dissilient stratifications that ceaselessly burst through various layers of cognizance, as in Slothrop's "Kenosha Kid" visualizations in which Slothrop is being managed sodium amytal this scene varies between the musings of the investigative specialists and Slothrop's recollections of *the Roseland Ballroom*. By and by, Pynchon's ludicrousness obscures what really occurs as Slothrop as far as anyone knows creeps through a can bowl among different articles of waste that are depicted in a horrifying subtle element, a case that step by step segues into the experiences of Crutchfield. Truth be told, these kinds of distrustful mental trips are wild all through the novel: Pirate's Dantean vision of a Guilt-Convention, the Komical Kamikazes, lastly this paper demonstrates perspective of Slothrop's "divided awareness," which is depicted as a sort of hive-brain of Slothrop's recollections.

We genuinely don't comprehend what even happens to Slothrop, who seems to fail out among mental trips of superheroes and nightmarish popular culture badlands. It is exactly these sorts of foggy spots amongst reality and dream that make it enticing to attest McHale's hypothesis of epistemology's rearward sitting arrangement to philosophy in postmodern books; nonetheless, these thoughts of presence are essentially fixing to inquiries of knowing. Brandon Kershner in *The Twentieth Century Novel* has censured McHale's hypothesis for being "too abstract to apply very consistently: just how do we tell whether a given novel is more epistemological or more ontological in its concerns?" (Kershner, *The 20th Century Novel* 77). As indicated by Kershner, anything can be perused as epistemological or ontological, much like postmodernism's own double nature: "Postmodernism may

be more a way of reading than a way of writing: virtually any work can be said to have postmodern characteristics if we read it in the right spirit..." (Kershner, *The 20th Century Novel*, 77). As incredibly "postmodern" as these distrustful dreams progress toward becoming, they are not as separated from innovation as you may think. The pioneers habitually played with the thought of divided substances by means of these same kinds of stimulating diversions, You could likewise refer to a couple of pre-current illustrations where the stunning and twisted are conveyed to extremes, for example, Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, *Dante's Divine Comedy*, or Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*. Blurs between reality and dream are, along these lines, not really intrinsically postmodern—journalists have been utilizing this procedure for a considerable length of time.

Maybe it is the intermixing of otherworldliness and innovation where Pynchon's actual "postmodern neurosis" is accomplished. Pynchon has made a substitute universe in which the paranormal and mechanical end up two essential fixings in a moral story for postmodern culture's way to the immaterial domain of the internet. All through the novel, there are references to Tarot cards, séances, and the White Visitation "monstrosities" who all have some sort of paranormal capacity. In juxtaposition to this "otherworld," there is a feeling that innovation persistently obscures the lines between invigorating and lifeless. Brian Stonehill in "*Pynchon's Prophecies of Cyberspace*" composes:

"By blurring the line between what's alive and what isn't, Pynchon enables us to see organic processes carried on by inanimate means. Metals in particular are understood to carry on life's electric impulses without loss of vital spirit. After a lengthy description of what happens, eventually, to 'thousands of old used toothpaste tubes,' Pynchon writes: Yet the continuity, flesh to kindred metals, home to hedgeless sea, has persisted. It is not death that separates these incarnations but paper: paper specialties, paper routines. The War, the Empire, will expedite such barriers between our lives. The War needs to divide this way, and to subdivide, though its propaganda will always stress unity, alliance, pulling together (130)...Our former engineering student's sense -- that the metallic can be made kindred to flesh if it's wired to the human spirit -- seems to foresee a path for the ultimate extension of human thought and expression across the phone lines, silicon chips, and phosphor screens of cyberspace" (Stonehill).

Pynchon's reality declares a thought of the Earth itself as being alive, or comprised of different tiny frameworks that lone Pynchon's "zooming in" can uncover:

"Consider coal and steel. There is a place where they meet. The interface between coal and steel is coal-tar. Imagine coal, down in the earth, dead black, no light, the very substance of death. Death ancient, prehistoric, species we will never see again. Growing older, blacker, deeper in layers of perpetual night. Above ground, the steel rolls out fiery bright..." (Pynchon 169).

In cyberpunk settings, there is a blend of the profound or supernatural with exceptionally propelled innovation, which makes a Baudrillardian feeling of hyperreality as talked about above. Maybe Pynchon's admixture of these domains is to hone his argument predictions of the internet, which has turned into a milieu, made out of the impalpable and frequently avoided the exposed eye. Maybe the best case of the mixing of vitalizing and lifeless, ontic and otherworldly, paranormal and mechanical, is the long history of Byron the Bulb, which, as past scenes, emerges unexpectedly as a digressional aside:

"Now it turns out that this light bulb over the colonel's head here is the same identical Osram light bulb that Franz Pokler used to sleep next to in his bunk at the underground rocket works at Nordhausen...Wotta history, this bulb, if only it could speak—well, as I matter of fact, it can speak...Here it is, The Story of Byron the Bulb" (Pynchon 646-7).

Byron's story is quickly exhibited as a digressive "side-story" that is a bunch in its uses of Pynchon's inclination for revealing concealed substances, as well as one of Pynchon's most striking pre-designs of the internet. Stonehill tends to the brilliant rationalization of Pynchon's the internet:

"Well, such a global information network operating 'at something close to the speed of light' was not even taken seriously as science fiction when Pynchon let Byron the Bulb shed his light, but clearly, in retrospect, the episode was prophetic, and now every bulb in Europe -- or every wired monitor screen in the world -- does know what's happened. Interestingly enough, Pynchon mentions prophecy itself at the end of Byron the Bulb's story, for it is Byron's fate -- like that of so many e-mail

addicts -- to have access to all the information in the world, yet be able to do little with it: Someday he will know everything, and still be as impotent as before. His youthful dreams of organizing all the bulbs in the world seem impossible now -- the Grid is wide open, all messages can be overheard, and there are more than enough traitors out on the line. Prophets traditionally don't last long -- they are either killed outright, or given an accident serious enough to make them stop and think, and most often they do pull back (654-55)" (Stonehill).

Byron's history likewise, obviously, delineates a key suspicion in which examples and associations with divergent components are associated in some sort of "plot." Viewings of these "shrouded" universes of the lifeless absolutely have the distrustful part of choosing whether or not these truths are "genuine." It is as though Pynchon is composing a substitute history of the lifeless that spotlights on different levels of cognizance, an environmental juxtaposition of frameworks we "know" versus the covered up or obscure holding up to be revealed maybe a fear inspired notion of the lifeless. Indeed, even Rocket 00000 is given an otherworldly, divine atmosphere, in which people never again control the very innovation they have made: "Everyone's equal, same chances of getting hit. Equal in the eyes of the rocket" (Pynchon 57). The rocket itself is "alive" and chooses its own game-plan, which intensely reviews the exemplary science fiction theme of innovation assuming control people in dystopian settings.

The genuine neurosis lies in endeavoring to clarify this marvel, which science and reason can't really clarify: "Every square is just as likely to get hit again. The hits aren't clustering. Mean density is constant, nothing on the map to the contrary. Only a classical Poisson distribution..." (Pynchon 54). The idea of learning outside the grip of human awareness is played with here, even an approaching apprehension of turning into a "preterite." Preterition, most essentially, originates from the Calvinist precept in which the choice to rise to paradise while the non-elect are deserted. All through the novel, it appears as though the characters trust they have been deserted in this innovative no man's land, being relinquished by God:

"There is a Hand to turn the time,/Though thy Glass today be run,/Till the Light that hath brought the Towers low/Find the last poor Pret'rite one...Till the Riders sleep by ev'ry road,/All through our crippl'd Zone,/With a face on ev'ry mountainside,/And a Soul in ev'ry stone..."(Pynchon 776).

This "melody of the preterite," to some extent, clarifies the very turmoil into which they have dropped, where the truth is good for nothing and human presence optional to ruinous entropy.

The "Circe" scene, at that point, is maybe Joyce's most Pynchonian snapshot of distrustfulness, where basically the greater part of Bloom's jumpy fancies are uncovered in a stimulating Gilbert and Sullivan-esque trek through different substances and methods of awareness. The scene has its own inner rationale of dream directed through Bloom's divided recollections; "reality" progresses toward becoming followed up on by these hallucinations, for example, the tobacco smoke and fan both going about as transitional gadgets to Bloom's dreams: "The fan, like the earlier cigarette smoke, wafts Bloom into the fantasy world, and some of the oddest desires and interests buried in the subconscious mind are interred" (Blamires 182). Like *Gravity's Rainbow*, we are never certain what precisely "happen" in this scene, what is dream versus reality—the peruser can never truly locate an adept introduction. This picture appears to cement the connection amongst Stephen and Bloom as cuckolds; despite the fact that Bloom was absent for Stephen's discourse of Iago in "*Scylla and Charybdis*," Bloom is by all accounts intuitively mindful of it—maybe an inestimable suspicion like *Gravity's Rainbow*. It shows up as though Stephen is a cuckold in an allegorical sense; maybe history, Ireland, or even God have all trespassed against him, "swindled" him somehow.

This feeling of fretfulness credited to present-day instructive procedures appears to prefigure Pynchon's thought of the extraordinary mayhem coming about because of these kinds of product frameworks and the resulting trouble in recognizing what is genuine and what is simulacrum: "There is 'gas' everywhere, not least the gas of inflated rhetoric and hectoring, wordy conversation. The rush

of words, of rumour, of news, let loose daily from this pulsing, hectic organ, is pumped into the life of Dublin.”(Blamires 45). It is maybe more suitable to consider this plan a particular kind of jumpy estrangement, in which it turns out to be progressively hard to recognize reality and reenactment because of these exceptionally complex frameworks of data propagation—where the simulacrum goes before the first model.

The idea I said in connection to reality in "Proteus" applies here too, where we encounter the occasions of the novel through intermediary and turn out to be progressively mindful of what is being communicated by means of a given cognizance I think these kinds of meddlesome, continuous flow contemplations are Pynchon's thought of numerous substances that conceivably have their own particular inward arrangements of information frameworks. Whatever the truth is, we positively experience issues in attempting to speak to it. Like Pynchon, at last, has a suspicious perusing of reality in which a huge number of points of view are spoken to as both epistemological and ontological issues, where our issues of knowing are generally identified with our originations of being.

### CONCLUSION

How might we start to arrange any of these tropes as either innovator or postmodernist? Certain authors marked as postmodern every now and again interaction pictures with content; so obviously, these kinds of meta-tests have been steadily ordered as postmodern. Much of the time platitudes, for example, "relatively revolutionary" apply to the pioneers who used these exceptionally same systems, and, as I examined opposite Fredric Jameson, the postmodernists frequently utilize "innovator codes." However, this kind of qualification generally segues into the assumed refinements between the pioneer and postmodernist rationale: the innovators "make it new," where the postmodernist as far as anyone knows reuse old material, "making the old new." I am not by any stretch of the imagination persuaded this qualification can be connected all around. Notwithstanding Pynchon's exceptionally imaginative exchange histories and purposeful anecdotes, he himself owes his very own lot exploratory edge. Actually, with the coming of "post-postmodernism," it intelligently takes after that postmodernism could have complied with a similar pioneer code of "make it new." These writings can possibly be both innovator and postmodernist at the same time as far as a basic hypothesis and feel. At the point when stylish designs are seen from authentic developments, in any case, Procrustean doubles emerge endeavoring to restrict these dynamic ranges. Utilizing recorded and tasteful developments reciprocally have made perplexity. "Postmodernity" and postmodern workmanship are not generally essentially part of a similar structure. Innovation and postmodernism are included an immense range of expressive tropes and sensibilities that are very theoretical to drive into dichotomous connections. Creative methods of the talk are liquid in nature, regularly subject to the changes of the social hypothesis. Rather than featuring the manners by which innovation and postmodernism are partitioned, we should center on how these intricate terms, when utilized as a part of conjunction and not in detachment, underscore critical parts of always showing signs of change authentic feel.

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